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As this book illustrates, the field of European 
studies is constituted by the need to con-
stantly rethink how best to study contempo-
rary Europe and the transformations which 
characterize it. European studies is, as Craig 
Calhoun neatly surmised, ‘always already 
there and still in formation’ (Calhoun, 2003a; 
see also Lindström, 2002; Manners, 2003; 
Rumford and Murray, 2003a, 2003b; Wallace, 
2000; Warleigh, 2004). From my per spective, 
the field of European studies has been one 
largely defined by three analytical  features. 
First, it primarily consists of  multidisciplinary 
perspectives on Europe, including language 
and literature, history, politics, economics, 
law, geography, sociology, cultural studies, 
and more (for examples, see Sakwa and 
Stevens, 2000, or Gowland et al., 2006). 
Second, the field consists of interdisciplinary 
foci on Europe as a place, space, and idea 
(for examples, see Kofman et al., 2000; or 
Griffin and Braidotti, 2002). And finally a 
relative absence of transdisciplinary methods 
for examining Europe (for exceptions, see 
Passerini, 1998, or Guisan, 2003).
While a discipline can be a community of 
expertise which considers itself a compara-
tively self-contained, teachable and knowable 
domain; ‘multidisciplinary study involves 
employing two or more disciplines, in juxt-
aposition’ (Ellis, 2003). In this respect, 
 multi disciplinary research involves scholars 
working in a fairly ‘self-contained manner’ 
while coming together to work on a shared 
problem (Denemark, 1999: 53; Lawrence and 
Deprés, 2004: 400). In contrast, interdisci-
plinary study goes beyond (multi) discipli-
nary comparison towards a more interactive 
and integrative approach between different 
 disciplines.
Transdisciplinary scholarship is even more 
demanding, involving research and study 
around ‘complex heterogeneous domains’ in 
order to address complex phenomena 
(Denemark, 1999: 53; Lawrence and Deprés, 
2004: 400). But whereas multidisciplinary or 
interdisciplinary work involves comparison 
of many perspectives, or cooperation between 
differing perspectives, transdisciplinary 
research is like standing on one’s head – the 
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reorganization of disciplinary practices in 
order to transgress and transcend pre-existing 
frames of knowledge organization:
Transdisciplinarity, understood as a critical evaluation 
of terms, concepts, and  methods that  transgresses 
disciplinary  boundaries can be a means to [a] 
higher level of reflexivity … As an epistemological 
and methodological strategy, transdisciplinarity 
proceeds from the insight that disciplines are 
 conventionally thought of  territorially, as inde-
pendent domains with clear boundaries. In fact, 
however, disciplines are  characterized by multiple 
interconnections and shot through with cross- 
disciplinary pathways. Consequently, the bounda-
ries between them must be understood – much like 
physical territorial  borders – as arbitrary products of 
social activity (Dölling and Hark, 2000: 1195–6).
Roland Robertson has argued that the 
 complex convergence of disciplines in the 
processes of globalization demands trans-
disciplinary approaches under conditions 
of globality (Robertson, 1996: 128; see also 
Hodge, 2002). The emphasis in this chapter 
will be on this latter approach and will  suggest 
a transdis ciplinary approach to European 
 studies I call ‘normative power Europe’. At 
the centre of this approach is an interest in the 
power of ideas of the common good, and their 
diffusion in a European  context.
Ideas of the common good in Europe has 
been rarely conceptualized beyond notions 
of ‘national’ in European studies. Clearly a 
means of understanding and analysing 
 contemporary Europe beyond national pre-
sumptions is an important but neglected theme 
in European studies. Although there have been 
discussions of postnational citizenship (Soysal, 
1994) and postnational democracy (Curtin, 
1997) in Europe, the analysis of the power of 
ideas of the common good that are neither 
merely national nor postnational has received 
less attention. However, the works of Craig 
Calhoun, Gerald Delanty, and Chris Rumford 
have addressed the idea of the common good 
in terms of the ‘collective good’, ‘good soci-
ety’, or ‘social solidarity’ in ways that seek to 
go beyond theories of society located solely in 
terms of national, supranational, postnational, 
or civil society (Calhoun, 2003b; Delanty and 
Rumford, 2006).
Calhoun suggests that ‘choosing incon-
sistency and a plurality of forms of social 
 solidarity and collective identity’ is challenging, 
noting that ‘if Europeans choose the course of 
pluriform social organization … then they will be 
sailing in poorly charted waters and in need of 
serious theoretical work to make sure the taken-
for-granted assumptions of nationalist discourse 
and its intellectual cousins do not close off 
attractive possibilities’ (Calhoun, 2001: 53–4). 
Delanty and Rumford argue that ‘in order to 
understand the nature of European material, 
cultural and political realities today a theory of 
society is needed’ (Delanty and Rumford, 
2006: 6). They suggest that such a theory is 
needed in order to get a sense of the notion of 
the ‘good society’ that does not presume a link 
between EU integration and European society; 
places Europe and the EU within a global 
frame of reference; and provides a resource for 
both social theory and contemporary European 
studies (Delanty and Rumford, 2006: 3–5). The 
transdisciplinary approach suggested in this 
chapter is intended to follow these initiatives in 
order to better grasp the power of ideas of the 
common good and thus  contribute towards 
theory development in European studies.
The intention in this chapter is to develop a 
normative power approach to European studies 
that can be applied across and beyond its con-
stitutive disciplines in order to interrogate and 
transgress the ideas and spaces on/of Europe. 
Students of European studies should be aware 
that there are some very good reasons why 
there has been a relative absence of trans-
disciplinary approaches. The participating 
 disciplines of European studies have differing 
acceptable practices, known as ‘normal sci-
ence’ (Kuhn, 1962), in terms of analytical 
 questions, theories and methods. Furthermore, 
Ben Rosamond has suggested that concepts 
such as ‘normative’, ‘power’, and ‘Europe’ 
are among the most contested concepts in 
the social sciences.1
In four parts this chapter will first explore 
the terms ‘normative’, ‘power’, and ‘Europe’, 
before applying the approach to an example. 
In each part I shall explore one of the terms 
as a means of illustrating how such a 
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 trans disciplinary approach may contribute to 
understanding Europe. Part one examines 
three different approaches to normative 
ethics – ‘virtues’, ‘deontology’, and ‘conse-
quentialism’ – in order to make sense of 
ideas of the common good. Part two looks at 
three different types of power – ‘relational’, 
‘structural’, and ‘normative’ – as a means of 
understanding the power of ideas of the 
common good. Part three considers three 
 different means of understanding Europe – 
‘civilizational’, ‘categorical’, and ‘cultural’ 
– to show how the power of ideas of the 
common good shape our means of com-
prehending contemporary Europe. Part four 
will attempt to apply the approach to the 
question of a European counter-terrorist 
response. I have chosen this example because 
of the challenges it presents to contemporary 
Europe and as a means of illustrating the way 
a normative power Europe approach opens 
up transdisciplinary thinking across and 
beyond disciplinary thinking.
NORMATIVE ETHICS
As a first step towards a more transdiscipli-
nary European studies, I will look at the way 
different approaches to normative ethics help 
us make sense of ideas regarding the common 
good. By the ‘common good’ I mean the idea 
of general wellbeing shared by all members 
of a society. This notion of common good 
obviously leaves open the discussion of who 
are members of a society and what might be 
their general well being. For example, does 
the common good apply to local communi-
ties, larger ‘nations’, Europe, or the whole of 
humanity? Similarly, is the general wellbeing 
to be found in equality or freedom, for exam-
ple? The study of normative ethics therefore 
involves asking what ideas of the common 
good are considered important, by whom and 
why. Normative ethics focuses on the impact 
these ideas have on actions taken by groups 
and societies, in order to understand which 
actions are considered right or wrong. In this 
respect it is usual to distinguish between 
three approaches to normative ethics – virtue 
ethics, deontological ethics, and consequen-
tialist ethics – each of which I shall briefly 
consider within the context of European 
studies.
Virtue ethics
Virtue ethics is currently one of the three major 
approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be 
identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, 
or moral character, in contrast to the approach 
which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or 
that which emphasizes the consequences of 
actions (Hursthouse, 2003: 3).
Virtue ethicists such as Philippa Foot and 
Rosalind Hursthouse draw on Aristotle’s 
notion of virtue in terms of character traits or 
dispositions (Foot, 1978; Hursthouse, 1999). 
This tends to put the emphasis on teaching 
and education as part of the social and per-
sonal development of moral virtue. However, 
as Slote puts it, ‘[V]arious forms of virtue 
ethics play down the importance or even 
deny the existence of generally valid moral 
rules or principles, and claim that morality is 
most fundamentally to be understood in 
terms of inner traits, virtues, that cannot be 
cashed out in terms of rules or goals’ (Slote, 
1995: 900). In terms of thinking about 
transdisciplinary European studies, virtue 
ethics encourage us to look at the character 
or traits which guide differing groups and 
their idea of the common good.
Virtue ethics and their emphasis on the 
moral character of social groups encourage a 
focus on the interpretation of virtues such as 
‘benevolence’, ‘generosity’, or ‘justice’. 
Such an interrogation inevitably involves 
examining the means through which such 
virtues become established and the extent to 
which a group shares them. The establish-
ment of virtues through education, religion, 
or other social practices clearly form an 
important part of understanding the shared 
basis of the common good. General exam-
ples of such virtues might include classical 
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merits such as temperance, prudence, forti-
tude, or justice. More religious virtues such 
as faith and charity entered the catalogue of 
valued qualities at a latter stage. It is also 
worth considering the way in which deriva-
tions of such virtues entered the discourses 
of European enlightenment in modern times. 
Hence, the French revolution championed 
the virtues of liberty, equality, and ‘frater-
nity’ (solidarity), while the European 
Union (EU) seeks the virtues of unity and 
diversity.
An example of a virtue ethics approach to 
ideas of the common good in Europe may be 
found in the Austrian sanctions crisis in 
2000. During the 1990s the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
the Council of Europe (CoE), and the EU had 
been busily institutionalizing post-Cold War 
virtues such as human rights and democracy 
as part of providing moral maps in the ‘new 
Europe’ (Manners, 2002: 242–4; Merlingen 
et al., 2001: 63–4). In February 2000 the 
creation of a new Austrian coalition govern-
ment including the neonationalist Freedom 
Party (FPÖ) led by Jörg Haider directly ques-
tioned these virtues. A mixture of reasons, 
including the role of party groups within EU 
member states and shared ideas of virtuous 
politics across the EU, led to the imposition 
of bilateral sanctions by the 14 other mem-
bers of the EU between February and 
September 2000.
The importance given to the virtues of 
human rights and democracy as ethical 
 reasons for the sanctions is central to 
 understanding the Austrian crisis. Public 
reasoning and debating of the problems of 
interfering in the domestic politics of another 
EU member state were to be increasingly 
heard throughout the seven-month period, 
particularly in smaller member states and 
those that had their own neonationalist con-
cerns (Gingrich 2006: 200–1; Merlingen et 
al., 2001: 73). Concerns for the counter-
productive consequences of the sanctions 
within Austria were also to be heard, with 
many commentators pointing to ‘widespread 
anti-EU sentiments’ in Austria, and increas-
ingly beyond (Howard 2001: 26; Merlingen 
et al., 2001: 73). Despite these concerns with 
foreign interference and  counter-productive 
consequences, it was the perceived virtues of 
the principles that held the sanctions in place 
until September 2000. It was then that the 
 committee of Ahtisaari, Frowein and Oreja, 
mandated by the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), whilst criticizing the 
FPÖ, argued that the Austrian government 
itself had complied with common European 
values (Falkner 2001: 11; Merlingen et al., 
2001: 72). This decision was made easier by 
Haider’s  resignation of the leadership of the 
FPÖ and the marginalization of the FPÖ by 
the Christian Democrats within the coalition 
government (Gingrich 2006: 231; Happold, 
2000: 963).
Deontological ethics
The central thought of Kant’s account of public 
reason is that the standards of reason cannot be 
derivative. Any appeal to other external authorities 
to buttress our reasoning must fail. Just as a 
learner cyclist who clutches at passing objects and 
leans on them for balance thereby fails to balance 
at all, so a would-be reasoner who leans on some 
socially or civilly constituted power or authority 
which lacks reasoned vindication fails to reason 
(O’Neill, 2000a: 52).
Deontological ethicists such as Onora 
O’Neill draw on Immanuel Kant’s notion of 
public reason in terms of duties and rules 
 governing action (O’Neill, 2000b; Reiss, 1991). 
As O’Neill’s quote illustrates, unlike virtues, 
a deontological approach involves reasoning 
the merits of action without reference to, or 
derivation from an external authority. Roger 
Crisp clarifies the difference between this 
approach and that of consequentialism thus – 
‘[D]eontological ethics [are] moral theories 
according to which certain acts must or must 
not be done, regardless to some extent of the 
consequences of their performance or non-
performance’ (Crisp, 1995: 187). In contrast 
to virtue ethics, a deontological approach to 
transdisciplinary European studies empha-
sizes the rationalization of duties and rules 
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which guide differing groups and their idea 
of the common good.
Deontological ethics move the focus 
beyond the character of social groups towards 
an understanding of group actions and inac-
tions. O’Neill and other neo-Kantians seek to 
emphasize the progressive and expansive 
role of public debate and reasoning in creat-
ing the rights and duties held to be important 
within a group. An awareness of the promo-
tion of such rule-governed behaviour through 
domestic and international law is central to 
making sense of this shared idea of the 
common good. Unlike virtue ethics, deonto-
logical ethics provides few absolute merits 
which might be pursued, rather the approach 
emphasizes the means through which actions 
are motivated and practised. In this respect, 
much weight is placed on the establishment 
of law, including both rights and duties, in 
the pursuit of the common good. Both advo-
cates and detractors of European integration 
have argued that Europe has become a 
‘Kantian paradise’ governed by domestic and 
international law such as the ‘acquis com-
munautaire’ of the EU (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 
2004: 71–3; Menon et al., 2004: 9).
An example of a deontological ethics 
approach to ideas of the common good can 
be seen in the genetically modified (GM) 
food crises from 1998 to date. Since its inclu-
sion in the 1992 Treaty on European Union, 
the precautionary principle has become an 
important feature of European international 
environmental law (Douma, 2000; Welsh, 
2006). In February 2000 the European 
Commission’s communication argued that 
the precautionary principle should be applied 
when ‘preliminary objective scientific evalu-
ation indicates that there are reasonable 
grounds for concern that the potentially dan-
gerous effects on the environment, human, 
animal or plant health may be inconsistent 
with the chosen level of protection’ (European 
Commission, 2000: 3, 10; Baker, 2006: 87; 
Douma, 2000: 141). The precautionary prin-
ciple provides a rule-based approach to deal-
ing with uncertainty and risk to life through 
a reasoned legal principle for action based on 
the principle that ‘prevention is better than 
cure’. However, the importation of GM maize 
and soya beans from the US during 1996–
1997 raised public concern, particularly 
 following the 1996 BSE crisis, regarding the 
need for a precautionary approach to the 
uncertainty and risk associated with genetic 
modification, production and impact in 
Europe (Carr 2002: 32; De Marchi and 
Ravetz, 1999: 748–51; Sicurelli, 2004: 
11–12). A mixture of reasons, including the 
conflicting motivations of international agri-
business and more local organic farming, led 
to a precautionary moratorium on the impor-
tation of GM products into Europe from 
1998 to 2004 (Carr, 2002: 33; Karlsson, 
2006: 49; GMO Compass, 2006).
The importance given to the role of the 
precautionary principle as a reason for 
the moratorium is crucial to making sense 
of the GM food crisis. The virtues of the 
precautionary principle and its application 
to GM food appear contradictory, with 
 advocates of ‘freedom’ (primarily interna-
tional agribusinesses such as Monsanto and 
Syngenta) clashing with supporters of ‘jus-
tice’ and ‘prudence’ (primarily advocates of 
local empowerment and international envi-
ronmental groups such as Greenpeace and 
Friends of the Earth). Similarly, the conse-
quences of such a precautionary approach are 
mixed, with concerns about the long-term 
impact on European bioscience contrasting 
with the significant consequences for biodi-
versity of pesticide toleration and transgenic 
hybridization. Despite these differing virtues 
and  consequences, European support for the 
precautionary principle in international law 
ensures that, years after the moratorium 
ended, most Europeans have a deep suspi-
cion of GM foods with low levels (below 1%) 
of GM crop plantation in Spain, Portugal, 
Germany, France, and the Czech Republic. 
The WTO ruling in September 2006 on the 
transatlantic trade dispute over GM foods 
makes clear that high stakes, large uncer-
tainty, and intense normative disputes over 
GM products cannot and should not be 
resolved through ‘normal’ scientific and 
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 politics means, prompting a need for extend-
ing peer communities, and ensuring the more 
consistent application of the 2003 Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety which is widely sup-
ported in Europe (Bäckstrand, 2003; De 
Marchi and Ravetz, 1999; Friends of the 
Earth 2006; Healy, 1999).
Consequentialist ethics
It is a necessary feature of consequentialism that 
it is a shallow philosophy. For there are always 
borderline cases in ethics. Now if you are an 
Aristotelian … you will deal with a borderline case 
by considering whether doing such-and-such in 
such-and-such circumstances is, say, murder, or 
an act of injustice; and accordingly you decide it is 
or it isn’t, you judge it to be a thing to do or 
not … The consequentialist has no footing on 
which to say ‘this would be permissible, this not’; 
because by [their] own hypothesis, it is the conse-
quences that are to decide (Anscombe, 1958).
Consequentialist ethicists such as Elizabeth 
Anscombe draw on and develop the utilitari-
anism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart 
Mill in order to argue for normative ethics 
based on the outcomes of actions (Darwall, 
2002; Geach and Gormally, 2006). Unlike the 
neo-Aristotelian or neo-Kantian approaches, 
Anscombe argued that a consequentialist 
approach did not judge ethical cases on their 
own merit, but looked towards the conse-
quences of action or inaction for guidance. 
James Griffin clarifies that ‘consequentialism 
[is] a term now used for the view that all 
actions are right or wrong in virtue of the 
value of their consequences’ (Griffin, 1995: 
154). Unlike virtue and deontological ethics 
which focus on motivations, transdisciplinary 
European studies using a consequentialist 
approach involves analysing the consequences 
of actions and their implications for differing 
groups and their idea of the common good.
Although consequentialist ethics share an 
emphasis with deontological ethics on the 
rights and wrongs of group actions, the focus 
of this approach is on the interplay between 
actors and consequences. The implications of 
this approach are significant for debates 
regarding the relationships between Europe 
and the rest of the world, for example raising 
questions about the merits of European aid 
and trade. This also introduces the problem 
of value  pluralism and the extent to which 
the merits of differing consequences may 
themselves be moral choices (Reader, 2000: 
356). This  problem has become widespread 
in debates regarding the relative merits of 
 pursuing the 1992 UNCED Rio and 2002 
WSSD Johannesburg sustainable develop-
ment agenda; the 2000 UN Millennium 
Development Goals; the 2001 DoHa 
Declaration; and the 2002 Monterrey 
Consensus at the same time, with very differ-
ent consequences (Manners, 2007).
An example of a consequentialist ethics 
approach to ideas of the common good in 
Europe might be seen in the Kosovo interven-
tion crisis during 1999. During the 1991–1995 
war in Yugoslavia, many European states 
became convinced that never again would such 
large-scale massacres of civilians occur while 
neighbouring states and institutions failed to 
act (Malmvig, 2006: 64–5). The violence in 
Yugoslavia did not end with the November 
1995 Dayton Accords, and by mid-1998 
Europeans were concerned at the escalation of 
violence by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
and the Serbian security forces (Latawski and 
Smith, 2002: 216). A ceasefire arranged by 
Richard Holbrooke with Slobodan Milosovic 
in October 1998 was soon broken by the 
KLA, escalating atrocities by Serbian secu-
rity forces. The EU Forensic Expert Team in 
Kosovo investigated three sites (Klecka, 
Volujak, and Racak) involving approximately 
200 civilians executed between August 1998 
and January 1999, in part contributing to the 
Rambouillet peace talks in February and 
March 1999 (Friis and Murphy, 2000; Rainio 
et al., 2001). The collapse of these talks coin-
cided with a renewed Serbian offensive 
against the KLA, leading to the launching of 
NATO’s Operation Allied Force in late March 
2006, and the fleeing of over 800,000 Kosovar 
refugees by the time the aerial bombardment 
ended in early June 2006 (Friis and Murphy, 
2000: 767; Huysmans, 2002: 602).
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The importance given to the anticipated 
consequences of military inaction are critical 
to appreciating the Kosovo crisis (Malmvig, 
2006: 76). From June 1998 to March 1999 
members of NATO began preparing for direct 
military involvement in Kosovo, fearful 
of consequences similar to Bosnia should 
they not intervene. By the beginning of 
March 1999 approximately 7,000 personnel 
(out of a planned 25,000) from the UK, 
France, Germany, and Italy were deployed in 
Macedonia in advance of a NATO activation 
order (House of Commons, 2000). The 
 virtues of ‘temperance’ in dealing with 
Milosevic and the warring parties in Kosovo, 
as well as ‘prudence’ in taking direct action, 
were dispensed with in favour of a two-
month NATO air campaign. In a similar 
way, the deontological reasons for non- 
intervention, including the absence of a UN 
Security Council mandate and dispensing 
with questions of sovereignty in international 
law, did not prevent NATO action, despite 
opposition from within some member 
states (particularly Greece and Germany) 
(Friis and Murphy, 2000: 768–9; Latawski 
and Smith, 2002: 216). The longer term 
consequences of the Kosovo crisis were a 
‘wake-up call for European leaders and 
European public opinion’ emphasizing the 
need for a ‘shared commitment to human-
itarian values’ in a ‘pan-European commu-
nity of values’ (Huysmans 2002: 600; 
Lavenex, 2001: 856; Solana, 2000: 28).
POWER
As we have just seen, ideas of the common 
good can be grouped into three different 
approaches to normative ethics, with diverse 
affects in the study of contemporary Europe. 
Similarly, the relative importance of norma-
tive ethics can change on a case by case 
basis, for example in the study of virtue 
ethics in the European Union it is often the 
case that ‘the most important factor shaping 
the international role of the EU is not what it 
does or what it says, but what it is’ (Manners, 
2002: 252). But the normative ethics motivat-
ing differing social groups are not the only 
factor shaping the power of ideas of the 
common good – the question of power and 
how these groups act must also be consid-
ered. The notion of power is one of the 
 central, and most contested, concepts in the 
social sciences. The study of power involves 
asking how ideas of the common good are 
acted upon, through what means, and with 
what effect. Here I will differentiate between 
three different types of power – relational 
power, structural power, and normative 
power – and how they are exercised within 
the  context of European studies.
Relational power
Power corresponds to the human ability not just to 
act but to act in concert. Power is never the 
 property of an individual; it belongs to a group 
and remains in existence only so long as the group 
keeps together. When we say of somebody that 
[they are] ‘in power’ we actually refer to [them] 
being empowered by a certain number of people 
to act in their name. The moment the group, 
from which the power originated to begin with, 
disappears, ‘[their] power’ also vanishes (Arendt, 
1969: 44).
As Hannah Arendt observed, relational 
power is the ability of groups to act in con-
cert. The notion of relational power places 
the emphasis on concerted action, but it also 
recognizes the transient nature of such power 
which can disappear and disperse as quickly 
as it appeared (Arendt, 1963: 175; Guisan, 
2003, 2005: 462–3). In this respect, ‘power 
is to an astonishing degree independent of 
material factors, either of numbers or means’ 
(Arendt, 1958: 200). Susan Strange sug-
gests that in its most simplistic formulation, 
 ‘relational power, as conventionally described 
by realist writers of textbooks in interna-
tional relations, is the power of A to get B to 
do something they would not otherwise do’ 
(Strange, 1988: 24). In transdisciplinary 
European studies, relational power is to be 
found wherever such groups are taking 
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 concerted action, for example in the rise of 
‘third way’ social democratic governments 
across Europe during the period 1998 to 
2002.
The ‘red tidal wave’ of the left that swept 
across Europe during the late 1990s is an 
interesting example of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the exercise of relational 
power (Bell and Shaw, 2003: 1; Ovenden, 
1998). The election of the centre/left govern-
ments of Romano Prodi (1996), Tony Blair 
and Lionel Jospin (1997) and Gerhard 
Schröder (1998) brought widespread expec-
tations that the political parties of the left 
would, for the first time, be able to act in 
concert (Economist, 1998; Ladrech, 2003; 
Walker, 1998). Most believed that sharing 
power in 13 West European governments 
would allow the use of relational power to 
pursue the political agenda of the ‘third 
way’, ‘new centre’, or ‘democratic socialism’ 
(Economist, 1998; Walker, 1999). Such rela-
tional power was intended to shape the 
 post-Cold War European agenda of political, 
economic, social, and foreign policy based on 
principles such as community, responsibility, 
accountability, and opportunity (Halpern and 
Mikosz, 1998; Dickson, 1999).
The relational power of the four social-
democratic governments in Germany, France, 
Britain and Italy, together with the support of 
the Netherlands, Sweden and Greece (and six 
others), was hoped to reinvent governance, 
regulate capitalism, achieve social justice, 
and pursue liberal internationalism in foreign 
policy (Halpern and Mikosz, 1998; Judis, 
2002; Stiglitz, 2001). Following Strange, the 
expectation would be that if some of the most 
powerful states in Europe sought to exercise 
relational power over these issues, then a left-
ward agenda should have been achievable. 
However, as early as 2003 the term ‘crisis’ 
was being used by the left after Silvio 
Berlusconi (2001) and Jean-Pierre Raffarin 
(2002), as well as Jan Peter Balkenende and 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, came to power 
(Bell and Shaw, 2003: 1). It seems clear that 
in order to understand the weaknesses of 
 relational power we need to understand the role 
of structural power in resisting the agenda of 
the ‘third way’, as well as the problem which 
the normative power of social justice has in 
articulation across Europe and the world.
Structural power
Structural power … is the power to shape and 
determine the structures of the global political 
economy within which other states, their political 
institutions, their economic enterprises and (not 
least) their scientists and other professional people, 
have to operate. … Structural power, in short, 
confers the power to decide how things shall be 
done, the power to shape frameworks within 
which states relate to each other, relate to people, 
or relate to corporate enterprises. The relative 
power of each party in a relationship is more, or 
less, if one party is also determining the sur-
rounding structure of the relationship (Strange, 
1988: 24–5).
In contrast to Arendt, Susan Strange argued 
that structural power is found in the shaping 
of the environment within which relations 
take place. The notion of structural power 
places the emphasis on determining frame-
works, rather than the concerted actions of 
relational power. In this respect we can distin-
guish between the importance of the ‘agents’ 
in relational power and the role of the ‘struc-
tures’ in structural power (see Giddens, 1979). 
The emphasis on power structures in areas 
such as security, production, finance, knowl-
edge and welfare advanced by Strange (1988) 
is related to Marxist critical theory with its 
emphasis on structures of production and 
social relations. Unlike relational power, 
structural power in transdisciplinary European 
studies can be found wherever social, eco-
nomic, and knowledge-based relations are 
determined by the emerging dominance of 
transnational media corporations in Europe 
from 1996 onwards.
In the mid-1920s a small number of major 
Hollywood studios controlled film produc-
tion, and 70 years later the transnational 
media corporations that own these ‘seven 
sisters’ of cinema now dominate the global 
media industries of film, television, radio, 
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music, newspapers, periodicals, and books 
(McChesney, 2001). As the Council of 
Europe’s report on ‘Transnational media 
concentrations in Europe’ argued in 2004, the 
rise in media concentration since 1994 had 
reached new levels through the domination 
of transnational companies that weakened 
national regulations and competition rules 
(Council of Europe, 2004: 7). The deregula-
tion of US media ownership rules in 1996 
(the Telecommunications Act), together with 
the liberalization of the EU market for media 
(the 1989 Television without Frontiers 
Directives revised in 1997), prompted a 
series of mammoth media mergers including 
Disney and ABC (1995), Time Warner and 
Turner/CNN (1996), Viacom and CBS 
(1999), AOL and Time Warner (2000), 
Vivendi and Seagram (2002) (Jung, 2003; 
McChesney, 1999). By 2004 the eight glo-
bally dominant transnational corporations 
were Time Warner, News Corp, Viacom, 
Disney, Bertelsmann, NBC Universal, Sony, 
and Vivendi Universal, of which only 
Bertelsmann (Germany) and Vivendi (France) 
are European (Jung, 2003, Nordicom, 2005a). 
While some report the relative success 
of European companies such as RTL/
Bertelsmann, Canal+/Vivendi, and the BBC 
in resisting the power of the non-European 
corporations to structure European media, 
this must be considered premature (Council 
of Europe, 2004; Esser, 2002; Nordicom, 
2005b).
Simply looking at traditional, terrestrial 
broadcast media in Europe tells us very little 
about the structural power of transnational 
media, however, for this we have to look at 
both ‘new media’ and content (Bondebjerg, 
2001; Cohen and Kennedy, 2000). The ‘new 
media’ of non-terrestrial communication 
places an emphasis on cable, satellite and 
Internet distribution, as demonstrated in the 
power of four corporations. The world’s biggest 
merger of AOL and Time Warner in 2000, 
together with the 2006 purchase of Myspace.
com by News Corp, illustrate the way in which 
the old media giants have come to dominate 
new media space on the Internet. In terms of 
cable distribution, the markets of Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Central and Eastern Europe are 
dominated by US-owned Liberty Global 
Europe (Liberty Media have holdings in SBS, 
News Corp, Time Warner, Vivendi, and 
Viacom). Similarly, the satellite distribution 
market in Europe has been largely dominated 
by just two corporations – News Corp (through 
the Sky group) and Vivendi (through the Canal+ 
group until 2003). In terms of content, the 
European media market is dominated by satel-
lite news from CNN (Time Warner), BBC 
World, and Fox News (News Corp); infotain-
ment such as the Discovery channels (Liberty 
Media), National Geographic (News Corp); 
and the History Channel (Disney, Hearst, NBC 
Universal); children’s programmes from 
Disney, Nickelodeon (Viacom), Fox Kids 
(News Corp), Cartoon Network (Time Warner); 
and music channels such as MTV and VH1 
(both Viacom).
It becomes clear that European social, 
economic, and knowledge-based relations 
are increasingly predetermined by the domi-
nance of a very small number of transna-
tional media corporations who shape what 
and how we come to know about Europe. 
As Christopher Marsden argued, when dis-
cussing the power of transnational media we 
need to look beyond the media to ownership: 
‘Interdependence and the structural power of 
capital generally is a more holistic explana-
tion of the story than the structural power of 
the media owner per se’ (Marsden, 2000: 12). 
It seems clear that attempts to regulate 
European markets, in particular media mar-
kets and rules of cross-media ownership, as 
part of the ‘third way’ agenda of 1998–2002 
were on a collision course with the fourth 
estate of transnational media corporations. 
The liberalizations of 1996 in the US, the 
UK, and Germany had already started the 
concentration of media into the hands of 
 corporations that were resistant to reregula-
tion and unlikely to have programming rep-
resenting the third way agenda in any fair 
way. An example might be found in the role 
of one of the now dominant new media 
 corporations, News Corp, which attempted 
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to overcome European resistance by using 
sport programming as a ‘battering ram’ 
against regulatory and cross-media owner-
ship rules (Robertson, 2004: 293, 298). The 
case of BSkyB’s attempted purchase of 
Manchester United football club, and merger 
of News Corp with Canal+, in 1998–1999 
illustrated how politics and media ownership 
mix in News Corp’s ‘anti-European Union 
views’ (Robertson, 2004: 298). If the relative 
power of elected governments is constantly 
weakened by the structural power of trans-
national capital and its negative effects on 
democratic pluralism (Council of Europe, 
2004: 4–6), we are left with the question of 
how ideas of the common good might be 
articulated in a globalized Europe. Here we 
should turn to the idea of normative power 
for an understanding of the power of ideas in 
post-Cold War Europe.
Normative power
[W]e rely on moral persuasion, the power of argu-
ment, and the power on shaming … Other factors 
in these circumstances of voluntary compliance are 
also important, such as the domestic salience of 
the norm, its legitimacy and coherence, and the 
extent to which it fits with other prevailing and 
well-established standards; but norms are 
expressed through language and the process of 
argumentation and debate can shape what is said 
subsequently in both domestic and international 
venues (Foot, 2000: 9).
If relational power is concerted action 
and structural power is environment shaping, 
then normative power presents a third form of 
power – the power of ideas themselves. As 
Rosemary Foot suggests, normative power 
relies on  persuasion, argument and shaming 
rather than action or structure to shape change. 
In contrast to the action and determination 
orientations of relational and structural 
power, normative power is a discursive for-
mation that relies on legitimacy, coherence, 
and voluntarism for its influence. Although 
sceptical, Strange had also noted the exist-
ence of normative power, suggesting it was 
‘moral authority, power derived from the 
proclamation of powerful ideas that have 
wide appeal, are accepted as valid and give 
legitimacy to the proclaimers, whether politi-
cians, religious leaders or philosophers’ 
(Strange, 1988: 23). Similarly, in his study of 
‘Europe in the making’ Johan Galtung 
argued that normative power was one of the 
‘three classical types of power’ and was to be 
found in ‘bad and good conscience’ (Galtung, 
1989: 14–15, 162 n. 13). In transdisciplinary 
European studies, normative power is to 
be found wherever powerful ideas and 
 argumentation are encountered, for example 
in the constitutionalization of human rights 
norms in Europe in the post-Cold War era.
The International Bill of Human Rights 
consists of the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 
the 1976 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, together with two 
protocols. These five accords, together with 
the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; 
the 1984 Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment; the 1989 Convention on the 
Rights of the Child; the 1990 International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families; and the four optional protocols, 
constitute the core international human rights 
instruments of the United Nations (Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, 2006). Although most Western 
European states had taken steps towards 
enshrining these core human rights in law, 
prior to 1990 the ratification and application 
of these core instruments was incomplete.
From 1990 onwards the normative power 
of human rights in Europe illustrates the way 
in which core rights came to be seen as 
 constitutive of the very idea of the common 
good across Europe. The end of the Cold War 
in Europe was marked by the November 
1990 Paris Charter of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
which recognized a ‘steadfast commitment 
to democracy based on human rights and 
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 fundamental freedoms’ (Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1990: 3). 
The signing of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, and membership of 
the Council of Europe (CoE) brought nine 
central European states into the realm of 
European human rights protection between 
1991 and 1993. The June 1993 Copenhagen 
Criteria for membership of the EU made 
clear that human rights protection (as well as 
protection of minorities) was a pre-requisite 
for accession. It is within this institutional 
context that 15 European post-Soviet and post-
Yugoslav states acceded to most of the seven 
core international human rights  instruments of 
the UN (the major exception being the 1990 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers). More specifically, 13 
Central and Eastern European states, 17 
Western European states, and three 
Mediterranean states (Malta, Cyprus, and 
Turkey) acceded to the 1989 Second Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (abolition of the death 
penalty) after pressure from the CoE, the EU, 
and international human rights groups.
This emphasis on the role of the three 
European institutions of the CSCE/OSCE, 
CoE, and EU in spreading human rights 
law overlooks the extent to which it is 
grassroots human rights movements and 
advocacy which has led the development of 
human rights in Europe. Human rights 
movements for the abolition of slavery, 
torture, political imprisonment, and the 
death penalty, are all primarily movements 
of people rather than states, as the work 
of Anti-Slavery International (founded 
in 1839 as the Anti-Slavery Society), 
Amnesty International (founded as the 
‘Appeal for Amnesty, 1961’), and the 
Association for the Prevention of Torture 
(founded in 1977) have illustrated. Chris 
Brown comments that:
It is precisely the role of AI [Amnesty International] 
and similar bodies to ‘carp’ and ‘denounce’  without 
taking on board all the  reasons, often quite 
 compelling in nature, for failings in the area of 
human rights … bodies such as AI, which do not 
possess direct coercive [relational] power, can 
attempt to promote human rights in a way that is 
less tied up with Western interests, and are less 
liable to charges of hypocrisy (Brown, 2001: 29).
It is here that we find the normative power 
of European civil society activism engaged in 
persuasion, argumentation and shaming in 
public, the press, the courts, state institutions, 
and international organizations ‘like water on 
stone’ (Power, 2002) in order to promote 
ideas of the common good.
EUROPE
Having considered both the reasons why 
groups act, and means through which groups 
act on differing ideas of the common good, 
we can now turn to the question of what are 
the effects on our understanding of contem-
porary Europe. This third section involves 
asking what the consequences are of examin-
ing European studies from contrasting ana-
lytical perspectives. What we will see is that 
ideas of the common good are related to the 
different analytical methods of European 
studies. The question of what Europe is and 
how we examine it is the only common 
 analytical focus that European studies 
shares, and is central to any transdisciplinary 
study. To illustrate the interrelationship 
between ideas of the common good, method 
of analysis and the definition of Europe I will 
differentiate between three means of under-
standing Europe – civilizational Europe, 
 categorical Europe, and cultural Europe (see 
Manners, 2003).
Civilization
There are those who have argued that 
11th September initiated a clash between civiliza-
tions. Here I disagree, a clash between civilizations 
requires that there are two civilizations, which 
there are not. There is only one civilization, and 
that is ours (Kjærsgaard, 2001).
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The opening quote from Pia Kjærsgaard, 
the leader of the Danish People's Party, sug-
gests a post-11th September understanding 
of civilizational Europe (Rydgren, 2004; 
Hervik, 2006; Andersen, 2008). In the post-
Cold War era ideas of the common good 
based on the idea of ‘civilization’ became 
popularized by Samuel Huntington (1993). 
Huntington’s argument was that religion 
became a means of differentiating between 
groups, and that conflict between these 
groups was inevitable (Batur-Vanderlippe, 
1999; Loomba, 2003; Marfleet, 2003).
The 1980s saw the biological racism of the 
colonial era adapted to cultural racism for the 
postcolonial era with 'colour' exchanged for 
'religion' (Balibar, 1991: 21; Loomba, 2003: 
13). Etienne Balibar argued that
current racism . . . fits into a framework of 'racism 
without races' . . . It is a racism whose dominant 
theme is not biological heredity but the insur-
mountibility of cultural differences, a racism which, 
at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of 
certain groups or peoples in relation to others but 
'only' the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the 
incompatibility of life-styles and traditions (Balibar, 
1991: 21).
It is within this context that other religions 
rather than other races were increasingly iden-
tified as the causes of European problems in 
the post-Cold War era (Zaslove, 2004: 75).
As cultural racism (neoracism) became 
popular in Europe during the 1990s, far-right 
political leaders such as Le Pen (France), 
Bossi (Italy), Haider (Austria), and Fortuyn 
(Netherlands) became enthusiasts for a civili-
zational reading of Europe as  predominantly 
Christian, white and closed to others (Batur-
Vanderlippe, 1999: 472; Marfleet, 2003: 84; 
Quraishy, 2003: 72; Wren, 2004: 153).
The 1990s also saw the growth of neona-
tionalist movements under the banner of 
‘anti-European’ sentiment, including parties 
such as the French National Front, Italian 
Northern League (after 1998), Austrian 
Freedom Party, Danish People’s Party, and 
Swedish Democrats (Chari et al., 2004; 
Gingrich, 2006: 214–5; Rydgren, 2002: 52; 
Simonsen, 2004: 361). Andre Gingrich 
defines neonationalism as ‘nationalism in a 
globalized period of aggressive postcolonial 
and post-Cold War readjustment’ (Gingrich, 
2006: 200). In this respect neonationalists 
seek to ‘enhance negative images of the 
European Union’ and ‘oppose the centralized 
and elite nature of the European Union in the 
name of the authentic silent majority and the 
common person’ (Gingrich, 2006: 214; 
Zaslove, 2004: 70).
We should be unsurprised that neonation-
alist groups dislike the European Union after 
the Austrian sanctions crisis previously 
 discussed under virtue ethics (above). 
However, less well known is the resistance to 
Article 13 of the Treaty of Rome which 
 provides the basis for EU ‘action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation’. Neonationalist opposi-
tion to the Constitution for Europe was 
undoubtedly guaranteed by the new Article 
II-81 in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the Union which went further in contending 
that ‘any discrimination based on any ground 
such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social 
origin, genetic features, language, religion 
or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, 
birth, disability, age or sexual orientation 
shall be prohibited’. The movement from 
‘action’ to ‘prohibition’ and wider-ranging 
reference to ‘any discrimination’ would 
clearly have been unacceptable to both 
neonationalists and neoracists.
In this civilizational Europe, some neora-
cist and neo-nationalist parties have seized 
the opportunity to invoke the need for ‘cru-
sades’ of white Christian Europe against the 
Islamic world, using the war on terror as a 
pretext – ‘This crusade, this war on terrorism 
is going to take a while’ (Bush, 2001a; see 
also Carroll, 2004; Zaslove, 2004: 75). From 
this perspective a Europe based on such a 
civilization would be a very reduced and 
barren one indeed, excluding almost 60 years 
of immigration as well as most Eastern 
European states; of course Greece, Cyprus, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Turkey, 
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Bosnia, Serbia, and Albania would also be 
excluded.
Category
‘Europe’ and ‘the European’ are also symbolic 
categories … As such, these symbolic categories 
are mutually imbricated and craft a field of cul-
tural meanings that produces its own emergent 
logic. This logic in turn defines the discursive 
limits of civilization and the relation of differenti-
ated human groupings to that civilization (Lewis, 
2006: 88).
As the discussion of civilizational Europe 
makes clear, our understandings of Europe 
are symbolic categories created by differing 
groups to serve political purposes (see 
Leontidou, 2004; Liotta, 2005). The second 
perspective looks at Europe as a category in 
order to escape the ethnic primordialism of 
the ‘civilization’. However, as Gail Lewis 
illustrates in her discussion of ‘imaginaries 
of Europe’, any categories discussed here are 
themselves the product of cultural meanings, 
often in opposition to others such as ‘the 
immigrant women’ (see also Lutz, 1997). 
While Lila Leontidou has found that regional 
narratives of Europe have historically focused 
on geophysical features such as seas, rivers, 
and mountains, in the post-Second World 
War period it is institutional narratives that 
have dominated (Leontidou, 2004). Similarly, 
in the post-Cold War world the category 
of Europe can be found through examining 
the institutional memberships of those organ-
izations representing and defining what it 
means to be European – the OSCE, the CoE, 
and the EU.
The OSCE is primarily a product of the Cold 
War era, created by the 1975 Helsinki 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. The Helsinki Final Act was signed by 35 
countries, including the US, the Soviet Union, 
and Canada, thus creating an East–West under-
standing of Europe ‘from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok’. By the 1994 Budapest confer-
ence meeting the CSCE had grown to 52 states 
who agreed to further institutionalization and 
a name change to the OSCE. As the world’s 
 largest regional security organization, its 56 
members must represent the largest under-
standing of Europe as an institutional category, 
including the US, Canada, Russia, five central 
Asian  republics, five micro-states, and 43 
European countries.
The Council of Europe (CoE) is Europe’s 
oldest political organization, created in the 
aftermath of the Second World War by the 
1949 Treaty of London. The Treaty was 
signed by ten West European parliamentary 
democracies with the aim of achieving ‘a 
greater unity between its members’ (Article 1). 
The CoE was thus a Western European 
organization which initially excluded the 
dictatorships of southern and eastern Europe 
because of their absence of individual 
 freedom, political liberty, rule of law, and 
‘genuine democracy’ (preamble to Treaty of 
London). Fifty years later, by the end of 
1989, the CoE had grown to 20 members, 
including the new democracies of southern 
Europe. However, the next decade was to be 
the ‘decade which made history’ as the 
Council played a crucial role in guarding 
democratic security and assisting the 
 transition of Central and Eastern European 
states to democracy (Huber, 1999). Thus, 
by 2003 the CoE included 46 European 
countries, the only major exception being 
authoritarian Belarus.
The EU is Europe’s main integration 
organization, with its beginnings in the 
European Coal and Steel Community created 
by the 1951 Treaty of Paris. As the Treaty 
was signed by the six Western European 
states who had been most affected by the 
Second World War, it was effectively a peace 
treaty, prompted by the 1950 Schuman 
Declaration (Fontaine, 2000: 20). After the 
1957 Treaty of Rome significantly expanded 
the integration activities to include economic 
production and trade, the focus of the newly 
created European Communities was on the 
‘pooling of resources’ in order to strengthen 
peace and liberty, including the free move-
ment of persons, services, and capital. By 
1989 the EC had enlarged three times and 
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included 12 relatively wealthy Western 
European parliamentary democracies. The 
end of the Cold War brought a deluge of 
applications for membership of the newly 
restructured EU, resulting in three more 
rounds of enlargement and a total of 27 mem-
bers by 2007. Thus membership of the EU 
currently includes 27 of the 46 CoE member 
states, excluding Norway and Switzerland in 
Western Europe.
This brief comparison of institutional 
 categorization illustrates the extent to which 
‘Europe’ is an open category. Whether focused 
on security (OSCE), democracy (CoE), or inte-
gration (EU), Europe as a category can include 
between 46 and 27 states, stretching from 
Lisbon to Bucharest, Ankara, or Moscow. But 
under any categorical definition of Europe a 
wide range of cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious diversity is always included, ensuring 
that there are no discursive limits to civilization 
in a neoracist sense.
Culture
In spite of all the difficulties, we are on our way 
towards building a European Community that 
cannot be ignored. In this often chaotic European 
assembly, the voice of France, which sometimes 
has difficulty making itself heard when it calls for 
the construction of a ‘social Europe’, still finds 
allies in other governments and in the public opin-
ion of various countries. Whilst all of them are 
deeply attached to their particular cultural tradi-
tions, they all implicitly or explicitly share our 
notion of freedom (Kristeva, 2004: 31).
Moving beyond discussions of civiliza-
tional or categorical Europe, it might be 
more valuable to look at Europe from the 
perspective of culture where differing cul-
tural traditions across Europe share some 
common notions such as freedom and a 
more social Europe. From this third perspec-
tive we can acknowledge that  geographic, 
ethnographic, and linguistic categories are 
primarily cultural constructions. Thus, a 
better understanding of the power of ideas 
of the common good will be looked at 
through  culture as a means of compre hending 
contemporary Europe. As Maria Todorova 
 suggests, ‘It is not symbolic geography that 
 creates politics, but rather the reverse … 
“Europe” ends where politicians want it to end’ 
(Todorova, 1997: 160; and Liotta, 2005: 67). 
But we should remind ourselves that politi-
cians and governments are themselves con-
structed through their particular cultural 
traditions.
Drawing on the previous discussion of 
institutional categorization and inspired by 
Todorova’s symbolic geography of the 
‘Balkans’, we can observe how European 
geography is a cultural production (Paasi, 
2001). Because Europe sits at the western 
end of the Eurasian tectonic plate, any 
 geographical definition of Europe must be 
topographic rather than geological. Hence 
geographical discussions of ‘continental’ 
Europe are somewhat misplaced, often 
replaced by discussions of Europe from the 
Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU). It is worth 
remarking that while CoE membership may 
include states from the ATTU, their land-
masses stretch from Baffin Bay (Greenland) 
to the Bering Straits (Russia). Also of interest 
is the way in which the EU also involves 
28 non-European territories around the world, 
involving the seven ‘non-continental and 
overseas territories of member states’ (includ-
ing French Guiana) and the 21 ‘overseas 
countries and territories’ listed in the treaties 
(including Bermuda).
Similar to geography, European ethnog-
raphy is also a cultural production, consist-
ing of over 100 ‘nations’ or ‘peoples’ 
(Fernández-Armesto, 1994; Pedersen, 
1992). But any such study of nations or 
peoples in Europe is highly problematic 
because of the contested nature of ‘ethnic-
ity’. Definitions of ethnicity range from 
Max Weber’s suggestion of ‘those human 
groups that entertain a subjective belief 
in their common descent because of simi-
larities of physical type or of customs or of 
both, or because of memories of  colonization 
or migration’ (Weber, 1968, in Guibernau 
and Rex, 1997: 2), to Paul Spoonley’s 
idea of ethnicity representing ‘the positive 
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feelings of belonging to a cultural group’ 
(Spoonley, 1993, in Guibernau and Rex, 
1997: 1). The difficult question arises of 
who, exactly, are the peoples of Europe? – 
Filipe Fernández-Armesto’s 1994 Times 
Guide to the Peoples of Europe allows 
space for Ruthenians, Jews and the Roma, 
but none for the millions of non-indigenous 
citizens from around the world who are 
naturalized in Europe.
European linguistics may provide us with 
a better insight into cultural Europe, but 
given the Indo-European language roots of 
much of Europe, we are again presented 
with the issue of no clear separation within 
Eurasia. The ten main linguistic subfamilies 
of the Indo-European language family, 
together with  non-Indo-European Uralic 
(Finno-Ugric and Samoyedic), Turkic, 
Basque and Maltese, ensure that languages 
spoken in Europe are shared with much of 
the world. The daily presence of semitic 
Maltese and Finno-Urgic (Finnish, Estonian, 
and Hungarian) languages in the EU illus-
trates the extent to which  Indo-European 
languages are not a sufficient identifier of 
cultural Europe. Similarly, European lan-
guages such as English (5.5 per cent of 
global population), Spanish (4.6 per cent of 
global population), and Portuguese (2.9 per 
cent of global population) are widely used as 
first languages around the world, to the 
extent that cultural production outside of 
Europe in these languages has become more 
dominant within Europe – think of the US or 
India, Mexico and Brazil for example 
(Buckley, 1998: 4–5).
Returning to Julia Kristeva’s opening 
quote, it is increasingly the case that, in 
spite of all the difficulties and resistances, 
cultural traditions tell us much about social 
Europe and any European community that 
might follow. Here it might be more 
 insightful to define cultural Europe by 
those cultural productions which are 
widely shared across Europe, for example 
Europop in the form of the Eurovision 
song contest and Euro sport in the shape of 
the UEFA European Football Championship. 
The  interplay between the EU, television, 
and entertainment/sporting bodies have pro-
duced cultural reconfigurations of Europe. 
For example, EU media policies such as the 
1989 ‘Television Without Frontiers’ Directive 
and the three MEDIA programmes since 
1990 have intertwined with the role of the 
European Broadcast Union (EBU) to encour-
age  co-productions such as the Eurovision 
Song Contest. Participation in Eurovision 
is  limited to active members of the EBU, 
including recent winners from Ukraine, 
Turkey and Israel, as well as participants 
from Morocco, Russia and Armenia. 
Similarly, the combination of EU politics, 
including the European Court of Justice’s 
1995 Bosman ruling, and the pro-activity 
of sporting organizations has broadened 
definitions of Europe to include Russia, 
Turkey and Israel, as seen in the Euro 
2008 (UEFA European Football Cham-
pionship) competition. Ahead of the 2008 
championships co-hosted by Austria and 
Switzerland, teams such as Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in group A; and 
England, Russia and Israel in group B had 
to play each other in order to qualify.
APPROACHING THE QUESTION OF 
A EUROPEAN COUNTER-TERRORIST 
RESPONSE
Throughout this chapter I have argued in 
favour of a transdisciplinary approach to the 
study of contemporary Europe that asks a 
series of questions about the power of ideas 
of the common good, and their diffusion in a 
European context. In each part I examined 
one of these questions: normative, power, 
and Europe, from three different perspec-
tives. In each response I tried to give an 
example from contemporary European 
 studies that illustrate the transdisciplinary 
nature of such an approach. Hence we briefly 
 considered the Austrian sanctions, GMO and 
Kosovo ethical crises; then the power of the 
‘third way’, transnational media, and human 
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rights; and finally some civilizational, 
 categorical and cultural readings of Europe. 
Although these examples drew on politics, 
ecology, economics, sociology, and cultural 
studies, I did not attempt to weave them 
together into a single analytical narrative.
To conclude I will briefly look at one 
question in European studies which demands 
a transdisciplinary approach because of the 
challenges it presents to atomistic  thinking – 
how should Europeans conduct a counter-
terrorist response? Following the  terrorist 
attacks against civilians in New York in 
September 2001, and increasingly so since 
the Istanbul truck bombings of November 
2003, the Madrid train bombings in March 
2004 and the London public transport 
 bombings in July 2005, Europeans have been 
asking themselves how to respond to such 
terrorist threats.
Ethics in counter-terrorism
The first question to ask is what would be an 
ethically normative way to respond to such 
attacks? A virtue ethics approach would tend 
to argue that Europeans should stick to their 
principles in any counter-terrorist activity, in 
particular arguing that these terrorist attacks 
are first and foremost crimes against human-
ity which require a cosmopolitan approach to 
security and justice. As commentators from 
the US, Pakistan, Turkey and the Lebanon 
acknowledged immediately following the 
events of 11 September 2001, these were 
widely seen as ‘crimes against humanity’ 
(Bhutto, 2002; Chibli, 2002; Guruz, 2002; 
Naim, 2002). European commentators were 
among the first to argue that such crimes 
must be understood within the wider proc-
esses of globalization and dealt with in the 
context of cosmopolitan politics and law 
(Beck, 2001; Habermas and Derrida, 2003; 
Kaldor, 2003; Mégret, 2003). A European 
virtue ethics approach would be expected to 
argue along the lines of Mary Robinson, the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: 
‘I said very openly and have continued to say 
that that’s [11th September] a crime against 
humanity and that it’s right and indeed 
necessary for the whole global community to 
bring the perpetrators to justice’ (Robinson, 
2002).
A deontological ethics approach might 
place greater emphasis on the need for 
 reasoned, legal actions against international 
terrorism, and would most likely sanction 
an international ‘just war’ as was seen in 
Afghanistan in 2002. A large number of 
 politicians, academics, and commentators 
around the world supported the US-led war 
in Afghanistan from 7 October 2001 onwards, 
with apparent UN Security Council backing 
in ‘supporting international efforts to root out 
terrorism’ (UN Security Council Resolution 
1378; see also UN Security Council 
Resolution 1368). The extent to which the 
US appeared to work through international 
law and organizations in order to pursue a 
‘just war’ through operations ‘Infinite Justice’ 
and ‘Enduring Freedom’ seemed a reasoned, 
legal approach to international justice which 
could be articulated across the globe (see 
Elshtain, 2003; Falk, 2001; Holliday 2002; 
contrast with Chomsky, 2003). Support for a 
European deontological ethics approach to 
counter-terrorism was removed when the US 
began preparing for the invasion of Iraq from 
October 2002 onwards, despite the lack of 
UN Security Council support and the largest 
anti-war protest in history on the 15 February 
2003 when millions of demonstrators took to 
the streets of Rome, London, Madrid, Berlin, 
and beyond.
A consequentialist ethics approach would 
seem more likely to place the emphasis on 
outcomes in terms of defeating terrorists by 
any means possible, perhaps including a total 
war on terror. From 11 September 2001 
onwards the doctrine of ‘total war on terror’ 
was increasingly at the heart of US conse-
quentialist logic which focused on defeating 
not only terrorists but all enemies, as US 
Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld noted 
on 11 September: ‘Go massive … Sweep it all 
up. Things related and not’ (Martin, 2002). 
Within a year this results-oriented strategy was 
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clarified by the chair of the US Defence Policy 
Board Advisory Committee, Richard Pearle:
This is total war. We are fighting a variety of 
 enemies. There are lots of them out there. All this 
talk about first we are going to do Afghanistan, 
then we will do Iraq … this is entirely the wrong 
way to go about it. If we just let our vision of the 
world go forth, and we embrace it entirely and we 
don’t try to piece together clever diplomacy, but 
just wage a total war … our children will sing great 
songs about us years from now (Pilger, 2002: 13; 
2003: 10).
The US invasion of Iraq from the 20 
March 2003 onwards divided Europeans 
between those following a consequentialist 
ethic (primarily pro-Bush governments in the 
UK, Italy, Poland, Ukraine, Netherlands, and 
Spain) and those following a more deonto-
logical ethic (e.g. Germany and France). As 
the disastrous consequences of the invasion 
became clearer after 2003, European govern-
ments in Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Hungary, Norway, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and 
Italy withdrew their military forces from 
Iraq. In 2006 it was also revealed that the 
total war on terror’s consequentialist ethic 
involves the illegal extradition and torture of 
terrorist suspects from Europe (see Amnesty 
International, 2006; Fava, 2006; Marty, 2006; 
Mayer, 2005; Priest, 2005). European conse-
quentialist ethics as seen in counter-terrorist 
activities such as Iraq, extraordinary rendi-
tion and other contraventions of civil and 
human rights thus make it very difficult for 
virtue ethics and/or deontological ethics to 
be pursued as well. In their place the counter-
terrorist discourses of war on terror and vio-
lations of human rights, rather than crimes 
against humanity and pursuit of international 
law, ensure that addressing the complex 
causes of terrorism becomes virtually impos-
sible (Chibli, 2002; von Schorlemer, 2003).
Power in counter-terrorism
The second question to ask is how best to 
respond to such attacks? Using relational 
power would tend to involve direct action 
with an obvious preference for those resources 
most ready for action, in particular the armed 
forces. The use of relational power in coun-
ter-terrorism has become the defining feature 
of the total war on terror with the Philippines, 
Saudi Arabia, and Jordan also declaring 
‘total war on terror’ (Alexander, 2003; Burns, 
2005; Faraj et al., 2004). The US sanctioning 
of relational power encouraged Russia and 
China to join the war against their own 
‘terrorists’ in Chechnya and Xinjiang (Hamilton, 
2004; Manners, 2007). As Jonathan Stevenson 
observes:
[A] full-scale Western mobilisation against transna-
tional Islamist terrorism – a total war on terror … 
[in which] the West’s intelligence, law-enforcement 
and military assets would be brought to bear against 
any actual or potential terrorist strongholds or sup-
porters … would amount … to furnishing bin Laden 
with  precisely the violent ‘clash of civilisations’ that is 
integral to his apocalyptic eschatology (Stevenson, 
2006: 96).
During January 2003 the total war on terror 
through the invasion of Iraq was promoted 
by US envoy Bruce Jackson (Judis, 2003). 
This led to the ‘Letter of Eight’ (signed by 
eight pro-Bush European leaders) and the 
‘Vilnus Letter’ (signed by ten pro-Bush 
central European leaders) apparently sup-
porting relational power through the inva-
sion of Iraq (Macmillan, 2003). The division 
of Europe into ‘old Europe’ opposing the 
invasion of Iraq (the popular response 
across the whole of Europe) and ‘new 
Europe’ (the 18 leaders who signed the 
Jackson letters) was openly encouraged by 
US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld 
as a means of weakening the EU and the 
UN in order to pursue  relational power 
(Levy et al., 2005).
Exercising structural power would be more 
longer term and entail addressing the socio-
economic and political conditions in which 
terrorism thrives, in particular through 
 economic and political aid, trade and sanctions 
(both positive and negative). By the end of 
2003, the division of the EU earlier in the year 
was beginning to be addressed through agree-
ment on the European Security Strategy (ESS). 
9781412933957_Chap31.indd   577 10/10/2008   5:22:48 PM
578 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN STUDIES
In particular, the ESS clarified the extent to 
which a common EU counter- terrorist strat-
egy would need to use structural power to 
address its ‘complex causes’:
The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its 
scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It 
arises out of complex causes. These include the 
pressures of modernization, cultural, social and 
political crises, and the alienation of young people 
living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also 
a part of our own society (Council of EU, 2003: 4).
Within a year the European Commission 
had clarified the extent to which structural 
power would involve taking action to address 
the root causes of terrorism:
Action must also be taken to address the root causes 
of insecurity and the factors which contribute to the 
emergence of terrorism. Steps aimed at enhancing 
security must be taken without prejudice to individ-
ual rights and freedoms and the openness and 
 tolerance of our societies must be maintained. At the 
same time EU actions aim to strengthen governance, 
including the rule of law, and to encourage the 
development of sound institutions both within the 
Union and in third countries (European Commission, 
2004: 1).
The exercise of structural power by European 
states has accelerated since the  terrorist attacks 
on civilians in Madrid and London based on a 
more holistic approach including both domes-
tic and international policies. There emerged a 
European consensus on the four pillars of an 
EU counter- terrorism strategy, firstly ‘to pre-
vent people turning to terrorism by tackling the 
factors or root causes which can lead to radi-
calisation and recruitment, in Europe and 
internationally’ (Council of EU, 2005: 3). 
Internationally, structural power is being 
applied through EU Partnership and 
Co-operation Agreements, including the 
Cotonou agreement, to ‘help address the root 
causes of insecurity which may contribute 
to the emergence of terrorism’ as well as ‘better 
sequencing of  governance, peace and security, 
linking relief, rehabilitation and development 
interventions on the basis of a holistic approach 
to … the prevention of terrorism’ (European 
Commission, 2004: 10, 15).
In contrast to relational or structural power, 
employing normative power would rely on a 
much broader approach to transforming the 
complex causes, radicalization process, and 
active symptoms of terrorism by engaging 
with the despair, alienation, grievances, and 
pressures created by economic, social, cul-
tural, and political change and injustice. This 
more holistic approach has its origins in the 
European counter-terrorist strategy discussed 
above, but the ongoing military failures of 
the total war on terror in Iraq, together with 
the rising public awareness and outrage at 
prisoner abuse, illegal extradition and torture 
by the US and its European allies is leading 
to calls for the exercise of normative power 
to address ‘the pressures of modernization, 
cultural, social, and political crises’ (Council 
of EU, 2003: 4). It is here that the division 
of Europe created by the invasion of Iraq and 
accompanying human rights abuses is start-
ing to be healed by a fragile consensus 
 heeding the words of Kofi Annan, the former 
UN Secretary General:
The notion of larger freedom also encapsulates the 
idea that development, security and human rights 
go hand in hand … This relationship has only been 
strengthened in our era of rapid technological 
advances, increasing  economic interdependence, 
globalization and dramatic geopolitical change. 
While poverty and denial of human rights may not 
be said to ‘cause’ civil war, terrorism or organized 
crime, they all greatly increase the risk of instability 
and violence …Accordingly, we will not enjoy 
 development without security, we will not enjoy 
security without development, and we will not 
enjoy either without respect for human rights. 
Unless all these causes are advanced, none will 
succeed (Annan, 2005: 5–6).
Such a consensus increasingly includes 
an acceptance of using normative power to 
promote human security as the core of a 
more holistic counter-terrorist strategy 
(Liotta and Owen, 2006). For the European 
Commission, human security means a con-
cern for indi viduals, not states, and encom-
passes both freedom from fear (e.g. conflict 
and human rights abuses) and freedom from 
want (e.g. poverty and disease) (European 
Commission, 2005: 2; Ferrero-Waldner, 2006: 
103–7). The April 2006 ‘European Consensus 
on Development’ is an obvious example of 
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this commitment to  normative power with 
its references to promoting human security 
in order to address the  root-causes of violent 
conflict (European Consensus on Develop-
ment, 2006: 3, 14) with an emphasis on 
common normative values:
EU partnership and dialogue with third 
countries will promote common values of: 
respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, 
peace, democracy, good governance, gender 
equality, the rule of law, solidarity, and justice. 
The EU is strongly committed to effective 
 multilateralism whereby all the world’s nations 
share responsibility for  development (European 
Consensus on Development, 2006: 3).
Europe in counter-terrorism
The third question to ask is what under-
standing of Europe emerges as part of this 
counter-terrorist response? A civilizational 
Europe would be one fully engaged in a 
‘clash of civilizations’ as part of a total war 
on terror. As discussed under civilizational 
Europe earlier, a larger number of groups 
around Europe have been keen to join with 
bin Laden and Bush in such a clash, for 
example with Ari Fleischer (the White 
House Press Secretary) and Silvio Berlusconi 
equating Islamic fundamentalism with terror-
ism (Berlusconi 2004; Fleischer, 2002). For 
Arundhati Roy this emphasis on civilization 
involves an ‘algebra of infinite justice’ where
the equivocating distinction between civilisation 
and savagery, between the ‘massacre of innocent 
people’ or, if you like, ‘a clash of civilisations’ and 
‘collateral damage’. The sophistry and fastidious 
algebra of infinite justice. How many dead Iraqis 
will it take to make the world a better place? How 
many dead Afghans for every dead American? 
How many dead women and children for every 
dead man? How many dead mojahedin for each 
dead investment banker? (Roy, 2001)
In contrast, a categorical Europe would be 
one where clear-cut categories of good versus 
evil would be sought and applied, with the 
argument that ‘you are either with us or you 
are against us’ (Bush, 2001b). As discussed 
earlier, from September 2001 to January 
2003, most Europeans were generally with 
the US in its attempts to counter-terrorism, 
including the ambiguous sanctioning of tor-
ture and extraordinary rendition. However the 
US invasion of Iraq, as well as the Madrid and 
London bombings, demonstrated the extent to 
which there are no such clear-cut categories, 
with civilians and human rights always being 
the victims (Guild, 2003). As the EU counter-
terrorist strategy from December 2003 
onwards makes clear, the phenomena which 
facilitate terrorist radi calization and recruit-
ment are to be found both within and without 
Europe, thus blurring any precise distinctions 
between ‘them’ and ‘us’.
Finally, a cultural Europe would be one in 
which all such constructions of civilizations, 
total war, good versus evil, and ‘with us’ versus 
‘against us’ might be understood as gross 
 simplifications of complex cultural proc-
esses. From this perspective it seems clear 
that the intention of bin Laden and Al-Qaeda 
was to provoke a response which would 
strengthen such gross cultural simplifica-
tions. Unfortunately the total war on terror in 
the pursuit of infinite justice is precisely the 
cultural response which the Salafi jihadists 
seek. A culturally aware European counter-
terrorist response would be one which under-
stood that ‘terrorism cannot defeat democracy 
in a straight fight, but democracy can defeat 
itself’ (Ignatieff, 2004), and that to suspend 
or abandon human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law in the name of security ‘would be 
to give the terrorists a victory they could 
never achieve by themselves’ (Ranstorp and 
Wilkinson, 2005: 7).
CONCLUSION: A TRANSDISCIPLINARY 
APPROACH
Obviously such a brief and cursory reflection 
on one of the most demanding questions 
of our time cannot provide anything other 
than a casual overview of counter-terrorist 
policy, but it does help to illustrate how a 
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trans disciplinary approach to almost any 
issue in contemporary European studies can 
be opened up for reflection (see Manners 
2002 and 2007 for an opening up of human 
rights and counter-terrorist policies). 
Similarly, it is worth noting how replies 
to earlier questions such as ‘normative?’ and 
‘power?’ tend to predetermine responses to 
later questions such as Europe?
As I have illustrated through this example, 
normative power Europe gives us a trans-
disciplinary approach to understanding 
why, how and with what effect differing 
ideas of the common good constitute, moti-
vate and shape Europe. Such ideas of the 
common good should not be overlooked in 
European studies for, as Victor Hugo wrote 
in 1852, ‘An invasion of armies can be 
resisted; an invasion of ideas cannot be 
resisted’ (Hugo, 2004: 441). This transdis-
ciplinary approach also suggests a means of 
developing a theory of society that goes 
beyond European integration to understand 
Europe in a global frame of reference, and 
perhaps thus giving us a better sense of the 
notion of the ‘good society’ in contemporary 
European studies.
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